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337 
The Shifting Definition: The Clean Water Act, “Waters of 
the United States,” and the Impact on Agriculture 
I. Introduction 
“Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil, and you’re a 
thousand miles from the corn field.”
1
 Agriculture has never been an easy 
way of life, particularly when water is the lifeblood that decides whether 
crops grow or animals have nutrients to survive. Besides nature’s fickle 
rains, agriculturalists also battle the added struggles of complying with 
environmental and conservation rules and regulations. From hydrating 
yards, to cleaning toxic spills, to providing a safe habitat for animals, water 
is a flexible, fluid, and fascinating compound. Indeed, as the famed natural 
science writer and philosopher Loren Eiseley commented, “If there is magic 
on this planet, it is contained in water.”
2
 Because of water’s importance, 
there needs to be some form of government intervention to protect this 
resource while still allowing water to be utilized efficiently.  
In the United States, the most important water and environmental 
protection laws were passed in the mid-twentieth century, beginning with 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.
3
 The passage of the Clean 
Water Act of 1977
4
 (CWA) and the Water Quality Act of 1987
5
 overhauled 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Both the CWA as originally 
enacted and the Water Quality Act of 1987 help form what is now 
commonly called the CWA as a whole.
6
 The purpose of the CWA is “to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”
7
 In the initial reading of this statement, it appears to be a 
simple and readily achievable objective; however, the definition of some 
terms (and the cross-definition of others) creates a confusing landscape. 
The CWA first notes that the waters eligible for protection are “navigable 
waters,”
8
 which the CWA defines as “the waters of the United States, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois 
(Sept. 25, 1956), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233210.  
 2. LOREN C. EISELEY, THE IMMENSE JOURNEY 15 (1957).  
 3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat. 1155; see 
also History of the Clean Water Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa. 
gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 1004, 101 Stat. 7. 
 6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018). 
 7. Id. § 1251(a). 
 8. Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
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 The remainder of the CWA is silent as to what 
exactly fits within the definition of “the waters of the United States” or 
WOTUS.  
In the early to mid-2000s, the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari to hear two cases—Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
10
 and Rapanos v. United 
States
11
—that would have a profound impact on the interpretation and 
definition of WOTUS. These cases helped set the significant groundwork 
for how the Court thought of WOTUS, navigable waters, and whether the 
federal government had jurisdiction to regulate those waters. While the 
cases provided some guidance, uncertainty remained.  
To help alleviate some of the confusion, the Army Corps of Engineers 
and the EPA each created documents that explained their joint 
interpretations of the Court’s rulings regarding WOTUS.
12
 The EPA, under 
President Obama’s administration, promulgated a clarification in 2015 
aimed at defining “waters of the United States.”
13
 To make matters even 
more complicated, President Trump’s administration then issued a final rule 
that repealed the 2015 Rule.
14
 This recodification of the pre-2015 definition 
pushed the CWA and WOTUS back into a regulatory scheme mostly 
created in the late 1980s,
15




                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. § 1362(7).  
 10. 529 U.S. 1129 (2000) (mem.). 
 11. 546 U.S. 932 (2005) (mem.). 
 12. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory 
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 app. (Jan. 15, 2003); 
Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm’r for Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Sec’y of the Army, Dep’t of the Army, Clean 
Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United 
States & Carabell v. United States (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 13. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 
120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule]. 
 14. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (“The agencies are taking this final action to repeal the 
Clean Water Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’ 80 FR 37054 (June 29, 2015), 
and to recodify the regulatory definitions of ‘waters of the United States’ that existed prior to 
the August 28, 2015 effective date of the 2015 Rule.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 41,206, 41,210 (Nov. 13, 1986) (moving the regulatory definitions of “waters of the 
United States” and related terms to a separate section of the C.F.R. in order to provide 
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On April 21, 2020, the EPA and the Department of the Army published 
the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR) to further clarify how 
waters of the United States are federally regulated.
17
 Now codified in the 
Federal Register, this new definition provides four categories of waters of 
the United States: “[1] [t]he territorial seas and traditional navigable waters; 
[2] perennial and intermittent tributaries that contribute surface water flow 
to such waters; [3] certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters; and [4] wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.”
18
 This 
Comment will examine the Navigable Waters Protection Rule and how its 
changes will affect agriculture across the country.  
The purpose of this Comment is to both provide a helpful guide on the 
history of the legal and administrative procedures of the CWA and 
WOTUS, and to interpret the current regulations and caselaw on the 
jurisdictional requirements of WOTUS. This Comment will follow the 
history of the CWA, followed by policy changes, relevant caselaw, and then 
an in-depth look at the NWPR and its application to waters. First, Part II 
sets the stage by explaining the codified language of the CWA that is 
relevant to categorizing WOTUS and defining the terms. Part III details the 
history of WOTUS, focusing on recent administrations’ changes beginning 
in 2015 with President Obama’s changes to WOTUS and moving forward 
to President Trump’s most recent announcement and reversion to previous 
rules. Part IV provides background and explanation of selected WOTUS 
caselaw. Part V examines the Navigable Waters Protection Rule in detail, 
noting the differences between the 2019 Rule—which repealed President 
Obama’s 2015 Rule—and the NWPR. Part VI explains how the NWPR will 
affect the water permitting process for agriculturists. Lastly, Part VII 
examines current litigation over the NWPR.  
                                                                                                                 
greater clarification of federal agency jurisdiction); see also Clean Water Act Section 404 
Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions; Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 
Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,765 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 232, 233) (adding 
further language to the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” to clarify what 
it encompasses). 
 16. See infra Part IV.  
 17. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 
110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401) [hereinafter Navigable Waters 
Protection Rule]. 
 18. Id. at 22,251. Jurisdictional waters are waters that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018).  
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II. Clean Water Act Sections 402 and 404 




 of the Clean Water Act 
cause the greatest number of issues for pinpointing an exact determination 
of permitting requirements. These sections are important for agriculture as 
their additional permitting requirements are triggered if agriculturalists 
produce a pollutant that is discharged into a federally regulated water.
21
 
Those concerned with the integrity of our nation’s water supply call for 
greater permitting requirements for agriculture due to the impact of farming 
and ranch activities on these waters.
22
 
Section 402, titled “National pollutant discharge elimination system,” 
allows for the permit of a discharge of “any pollutant, or combination of 
pollutants.”
23
 The difficulty surrounding this permitting is determining what 
exactly qualifies as a: (1) point source; (2) discharge; (3) pollutant; and (4) 
navigable waters.
24
 Section 502 provides the black-letter definition for these 
terms. A point source is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance” of a pollutant.
25
 Pollutant “means dredged spoil, solid waste, 
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical 
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or 
discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and 
agricultural waste” that have been “discharged into water.”
26
 A discharge is 
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”
27
 




Section 404, titled “Permits for dredged or fill material,” authorizes the 
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to “issue 
permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable 
waters at specified disposal sites.”
29
 This section of the CWA also allows 
                                                                                                                 
 19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018). 
 20. Id. § 1344. 
 21. Id. §§ 1342, 1344. 
 22. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of 
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2013) (“If agricultural pollution is 
largely unregulated, then the nation’s waters will continue to be impaired.”). 
 23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).  
 24. See, e.g., id. § 1342(a)(1), (a)(4), (f). 
 25. Id. § 1362(14).  
 26. Id. § 1362(6). 
 27. Id. § 1362(12). 
 28. Id. § 1362(7). 
 29. Id. § 1344(a), (d). 
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the Administrator of the EPA to work alongside the Army Secretary in 
issuing these permits.
30
 However, the CWA takes agricultural interests into 
account by defining a point source as “not includ[ing] agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”
31
 
While these definitions may appear straightforward on paper, applying 
them in practice is no simple task. Many grassroots advocacy groups and 
trade associations demanded a clear system that could identify whether the 
features of the land they were attempting to alter would require a national 
pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit.
32
 Instead of 
arguing over intricacies and nuances of the land on a case-by-case basis, 
these groups strongly suggested that there should be a broad and easy-to-
interpret set of rules.
33
 
III. Administrative and Executive Procedures 
A. 2015 Rule – President Obama 
In 2015, the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers promulgated 
the Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States.”
34
 The 
goal of this clarification was to expand the EPA’s jurisdiction under the 
CWA to “reach[] beyond waters that are navigable in fact.”
35
 This final rule 
redefined several terms to determine the jurisdictional bounds of WOTUS 
under the CWA.
36
 As before, traditional navigable waters remained under 
the authority of the CWA.
37
 However, the 2015 Rule modified the 
regulatory enforcement of the CWA to include more “bright-line 
boundaries . . . and limit the need for case-specific analysis” to determine 
whether a water fell under federal jurisdiction.
38
 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. § 1344(b), (c). 
 31. Id. § 1362(14).  
 32. See Chris Clayton, New Clean Water Rule Released, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (Jan. 23, 
2020, 2:28 PM CST), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/AG/news/world-policy/article/ 
2020/01/23/ag-groups-praise-trump-waters-us. 
 33. See id. (reporting that American Farm Bureau Federation president Zippy Duval 
praised the NWPR because it “provides clarity and certainty”).  
 34. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 
C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 35. Id. at 37,055. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
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Under the 2015 Rule, tributaries were redefined “as waters that are 
characterized by the presence of physical indicators of flow—bed and 
banks and ordinary high water mark—and that contribute flow directly or 
indirectly to a traditional navigable water, an interstate water, or the 
territorial seas.”
39
 This definition relied heavily on the “physical indicators” 
of these waters and whether their flow could move materials to waters 
further downstream.
40
 The rule continued to require permitting for ditches 
where “science clearly demonstrate[d] [the ditches] [we]re functioning as a 
tributary.”
41
 The 2015 Rule noted that tributaries under the authority of the 
permitting system of the CWA had to be waters that “affect[ed] the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters.”
42
 
Finally, the 2015 Rule used Justice Kenney’s “significant nexus” standard 




Adjacent waters under the jurisdictional authority of the CWA permitting 
regime had to “have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters, 
interstate waters, and the territorial seas based upon their hydrological and 
ecological connections to, and interactions with, those waters.”
44
 The final 
rule then defined adjacent to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” 
other waters of the United States.
45
 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
the EPA further clarified three instances where such neighboring waters 
became part of the waters of the United States system.
46
 Like the tributaries 
defined earlier, these adjacent waters are jurisdictional under the CWA.
47
 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 37,058. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 37,059; see also 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For 
further discussion of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, see infra Section IV.C.  
 44. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (stating these three circumstances) (“(1) Waters located in whole or in part 
within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate 
water, the territorial seas, an impoundment of a jurisdictional water, or a tributary, as defined 
in the rule. (2) Waters located in whole or in part in the 100-year floodplain and that are 
within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate 
water, the territorial seas, an impoundment, or a tributary, as defined in the rule (‘floodplain 
waters’). (3) Waters located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a 
traditional navigable water or the territorial seas and waters located within 1,500 feet of the 
ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes.”). 
 47. Id.  
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As a result, they must have a clear “hydrological and ecological 




Lastly, the 2015 Rule encouraged interpretation of the significant nexus 
standard on a case-by-case analysis based on relevant scientific and legal 
evidence.
49
 The 2015 Rule acknowledged five types of waters subject to 
this significant nexus analysis: “[1] Prairie potholes; [2] Carolina and 
Delmarva bays; [3] pocosins; [4] western vernal pools in California; and [5] 
Texas coastal prairie wetlands.”
50
 As noted in the names of these types of 
waters, they were often limited to a specific geographic area. To determine 
whether these specific types of waters fell under the jurisdictional bounds 
of the NPDES (and the CWA), the entire watershed system is to be 
considered as a group.
51
 The whole group should include both the specific 
water system being examined, as well as the “nearest traditional navigable 
water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.”
52
 
As a whole, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA wanted to 
create a final rule that provided greater clarity for determining the 
jurisdictional limits of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 while incorporating a 
greater reliance on science and continuing to protect the waters of the 
United States.
53
 Environmental groups praised the 2015 Rule, but industry 
groups and some trade associations were outraged as they claimed vast 
overreach by the federal government.
54
 The agricultural industry, headed by 
the American Farm Bureau Federation, led the charge against the final rule, 
with help from mining and manufacturing industries.
55
 What ensued was a 
mass of litigation in various district courts across the nation.
56
 Some of the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 37,058–59. 
 50. Id. at 37,059. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 37,055. 
 54. See Rebecca Lessner, Environmentalists Praise New Clean Water Rules; Farmers 
Upset, MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (May 27, 2015), https://marylandreporter.com/2015/05/ 
27/environmentalists-praise-new-clean-water-rules-farmers-upset/. 
 55. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (challenging the 
2015 Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act); id. at 499 n.1 (listing the first three 
private party plaintiffs in the suit as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American 
Petroleum Institute, and the American Road and Transportation Builders Association). 
 56. See, e.g., Colorado v. EPA, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1309–10 (D. Colo. 2020) 
(“Several states—including Colorado—successfully sued to enjoin the 2015 Rule.”); 
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lawsuits claimed that the Agencies
57
 failed to follow the guidelines outlined 
in the Administrative Procedure Act for promulgating a final rule,
58
 but the 
merits of those claims are beyond the scope of this Comment. Overall, 
President Obama’s 2015 Rule steered the regulation of waters of the United 
States towards science-based determinations to protect these waters, but at 
the cost of complex and time-intensive case-by-case examinations. 
B. 2018 Rule – President Trump 
Within two months of being sworn in as President of the United States, 
President Trump and his administration set a goal to repeal the 2015 Rule.
59
 
The administration’s executive order promulgated a policy that “[i]t is in 
the national interest to ensure that the Nation’s navigable waters are kept 
free from pollution, while at the same time promoting economic growth, 
minimizing regulatory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of 
the Congress and the States under the Constitution.”
60
 The executive order 
created a two-step process: (1) repeal the 2015 Rule defining “waters of the 
United States” and replace with regulation existing prior to the 2015 Rule; 
and (2) publish a new rule that revises the 2015 Rule and all related orders 
and regulations to make them consistent with the policy as set forth by the 
Executive Order.
61
 The main goal of Step 1 was to assess which rules 
would be followed and to help clarify the confusing regulations that are 
applicable in some states but not others. With the enactment of Step 1—and 
before the finalization of Step 2—permit applicants had to follow the pre-
2015 regulations,
62
 along with addendums that were consistent with 
previous Supreme Court decisions and historical EPA practices.
63
 The final 
                                                                                                                 
California v. Wheeler, No. 20-cv-03005-RS, 2020 WL 3403072, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 
2020) (“Multiple parties sought judicial review of the 2015 Rule in courts across the 
country.”). 
 57. “Agencies” is used frequently throughout this Comment to describe both the EPA 
and the Army Corps of Engineers.  
 58. See, e.g., Wheeler, 2020 WL 3403072, at *1. 
 59. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. In October 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a nationwide 
stay of the 2015 Rule in one of the many lawsuits challenging it. See Ohio v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 713 F. App’x 489 (2018) 
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the judgment in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t 
of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018)). 
 63. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,497 (instructing the EPA and Army 
Corps of Engineers to interpret the CWA term “navigable waters” in a manner “consistent 
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action taken under Step 2 was to revise and replace both the pre-2015 
regulations and the 2015 Rule.
64
  
Step 1 of this two-step process was finalized in October 2019 and 
became effective on December 23, 2019.
65
 President Trump’s 
administration provided four primary reasons for repealing the 2015 Rule. 
These justifications included that the 2015 Rule: overstepped the Agencies’ 
authority under the CWA; failed to consider the policy objective of the 
CWA; encroached on the rights of states to regulate pollution and water 




Before the implementation of Step 2, President Trump’s administration 
in 2018 issued a rule which created a delay for the pending definitions 
previously allowed under President Obama’s administration. This new rule 
pushed the effective date of the new definitions to February 6, 2020.
67
 The 
2017 Executive Order also instructed the EPA and Army Corps of 
Engineers to interpret “navigable waters”
68
 to be “consistent with the 




Step 2, which culminated in 2020 with the promulgation of the 
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, created a single set of regulations that 
are clear and easy for the Agencies to understand and follow, consistent 
with the 2017 Executive Order.
70
  
Although these executive orders and final rules were a major step 
forward in the rollback of what the Trump administration and certain 
                                                                                                                 
with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006)”). 
 64. See infra Part V. 
 65. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 
110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200, 5,201 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 
C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
 68. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2018). 
 69. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
 70. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17. 
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grassroots organization perceived as a major “overreach”
71
 by President 
Obama’s 2015 Rule, there were (and are) many pending cases, battling over 
what test should apply in determining whether the federal government has 
jurisdiction over the permitting of specific waters. Some courts have 
implemented Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test,
72
 while others 
remained undecided,
73
 and yet others followed some combination of the 
tests.
74
 As a result, there is a patchwork of regulatory confusion and 
litigation that continues to muddy the WOTUS definition. However, 
because the NWPR has now replaced the 2015 Rule, many pending court 
cases have been rendered moot.
75
  
IV. CWA and WOTUS Caselaw 
Two Supreme Court cases in the early 2000s were highly influential on 
the regulation and permitting of navigable waters under the Clean Water 
Act.
76
 However, the arguments made in these two cases over how to define 
a navigable water had already been litigated extensively over a decade prior 
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
77
 These three cases are 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Farm Bureau Hails District Court WOTUS Decision, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N 
(June 11, 2018), https://www.fb.org/newsroom/farm-bureau-hails-district-court-wotus-
decision.  
 72. See, e.g., N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s concurrence [in Rapanos] provides the controlling rule of 
law . . . .”); Jones Creek Inv’rs, LLC v. Columbia Cty., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1304 (S.D. Ga. 
2015) (“The Eleventh Circuit has adopted Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant nexus’ test as the 
governing definition of ‘navigable waters’ under Rapanos.”). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to 
decide which Rapanos standard controls because “the evidence presented at trial supports 
[the jury’s guilty verdict under] all three of the Rapanos standards”). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We agree 
with the conclusion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that neither the plurality’s test nor 
Justice Kennedy’s can be viewed as relying on narrower grounds than the other, and that, 
therefore, a strict application of Marks is not a workable framework for determining the 
governing standard established in Rapanos. We also agree with its conclusion that each of 
the plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test should be used to determine the Corps’ 
jurisdiction under the CWA.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2020) (dismissing an appeal 
from the denial of a preliminary injunction of the 2015 Rule on the ground that the Rule’s 
repeal and replacement had mooted the controversy). 
 76. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  
 77. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/5
2021] COMMENTS 347 
 
 
among the most significant water law cases for arguments about federal 
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. However, the most recent Supreme 
Court decision regarding the CWA and permitting occurred in County of 
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.
78
 
A. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.  
Tracing WOTUS cases chronologically, Riverside set the stage for the 
first showdown between the Agencies and property owners over the 
definition of waters of the United States. Here, the Army Corps of 
Engineers filed a lawsuit in federal district court to enjoin Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside) from placing fill material on the property 
without permission from the Corps.
79
 The district court initially held that 
part of Riverside’s property was a covered wetland and enjoined Riverside 
from filling the land with dredged material until it received a permit from 
the Corps.
80
 Through several stages of litigation between the district court 
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
81
 along with the changing definition 
of “wetlands,” Riverside eventually reached the Supreme Court.
82
  
Using statutory interpretation of the CWA, the Court gave a wide-
ranging reading to the jurisdiction over types of waters the Corps had 
authority to regulate.
83
 The Court held that two aspects of the Clean Water 
Act of 1977 confirmed that the Corps had the authority to require permits of 
certain discharges of fill material in wetlands.
84
 The Court based this 
conclusion on two findings. First, Congress’s explicit refusal to overrule an 
agency’s determination was a sign that its original delineation of authority 
                                                                                                                 
 78. 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).  
 79. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 124. 
 80. Id. at 125.  
 81. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(“We construed the Corps wetlands definition narrowly and concluded that Riverside's 
property is not a wetland and that, therefore, the Corps has no jurisdiction over it.”).  
 82. See 474 U.S. at 125–26. 
 83. See id. at 139. 
 84. Id. at 138–39 (“First, in amending § 404 to allow federally approved state permit 
programs to supplant regulation by the Corps of certain discharges of fill material, Congress 
provided that the States would not be permitted to supersede the Corps’ jurisdiction to 
regulate discharges into actually navigable waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of 
the tide, ‘including wetlands adjacent thereto.’ . . . [Second], [t]he enactment of [an 
appropriation of $6 million for completing a National Wetlands Inventory] reflects 
congressional recognition that wetlands are a concern of the Clean Water Act . . . .”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
348 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:337 
 
 
to that agency was “reasonable.”
85
 Second, those who suggested removing 
“wetlands” from the “navigable waters” definition did not think that 
elimination of the term was appropriate, but rather that the jurisdiction 
given to the Corps was necessary to regulate discharges of pollution.
86
 This 
decision clarified that the Corps and the EPA had broad discretion in 
protecting waters.  
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) 
While the Court in Riverside examined the CWA through a wide lens, it 
took a narrower stance sixteen years later in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) involved a dispute over 
filling excavation trenches, which required permitting because the trenches 
had become ponds for migratory birds.
87
 Section 404(a) of the Clean Water 
Act requires a permit for the “discharge of dredged or fill materials into the 
navigable waters,”
88
 in which “navigable waters” is further clarified to 
mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
89
 The 
Army Corps of Engineers had previously defined the term “waters of the 
United States” to contain “waters such as intrastate lake[s], rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, 
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, 




Eventually, the Army Corps of Engineers declined to grant SWANCC a 
section 404(a) permit to fill the excavation trenches because SWANCC 
failed to prove that this solution was the least damaging method for disposal 
of the waste.
91
 The district court ruled in favor of SWANCC, but the 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 137 (“Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress’ failure to 
act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least some 
evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative 
construction has been brought to Congress’ attention through legislation specifically 
designed to supplant it.”).  
 86. Id.  
 87. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
163–64 (2001). 
 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2018).  
 89. Id. § 1362(7). 
 90. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 91. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 165. 
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Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed, holding the CWA “reaches as many 
waters as the Commerce Clause allows.”
92
 
The issue before the Court narrowed to whether the Clean Water Act’s 
jurisdiction reaches intrastate waters—including excavation trenches which 
had recently become homes of migratory birds.
93
 In writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to extend the reasoning in 
Riverside
94
 to include “isolated ponds” in “§ 404(a)’s definition of 
navigable waters because they serve as a habitat for migratory birds.”
95
 The 
Court further held that “[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of 
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the 
CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been 
navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”
96
 
SWANCC provided a restriction on the federal government’s control over 
waters of the United States. While there may be the opportunity for the 
CWA to extend to pollutants that reach directly into federally regulated 
waters, other instances are unable to meet the navigable waters threshold.
97
 
As the Court noted, “[w]e cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional 
use of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for 
reading the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute.”
98
 This decision 
refined and narrowed what authority the government had to regulate waters 
under the CWA. 
C. Rapanos v. United States 
Only a few years later, the Supreme Court heard another CWA 
permitting case that questioned the reach of the waters of the United States. 
Rapanos v. United States involved an individual who wanted to fill 
wetlands on his property to then develop it.
99
 However, the CWA required 
Rapanos to receive a permit to fill these wetlands because they were 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 166. 
 93. See id. at 162. 
 94. 474 U.S. 121, 134–35 (1985) (noting that adjacent wetlands can serve as habitats for 
aquatic species and are “integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture 
creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water”). 
 95. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 171–72 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 96. Id. at 172.  
 97. Id. at 173–74. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 547 U.S. 715, 719–20 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
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classified as “waters of the United States.”
100
 The district court upheld the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that Rapanos’s wetlands were 
included as “waters of the United States.”
101
 Later, the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed, noting that the “hydrological connection” between the wetlands 




There were two differing opinions written to resolve this case before the 
Supreme Court.
103
 Because neither opinion received a majority of the nine-
justice panel, each opinion contained distinct language that failed to clarify 
the final extension of waters of the United States. In the end, the Court 




Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion received support from Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. This opinion noted that “the 
phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those relatively 
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming 
geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as 
‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”
105
 While this definition does 
afford some regulation under the CWA, the above “does not include 
channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally,” and the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ expansion of this rule was not “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”
106
 Only waters with a “continuous 
surface connection” to waters that are already considered “waters of the 
United States” fell under federal jurisdiction.
107
 Justice Scalia’s analysis 
lends to his attitude towards government intervention: less federal oversight 
is a good thing.
108
 Justice Scalia noted the problem in deciding what is 
covered as a federally regulated water under the CWA: it is “difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 720–21. 
 101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. See Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629, 640, 648 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 103. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 753–57.  
 104. Id. at 757.  
 105. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion). 
 106. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984)). 
 107. Id. at 742. 
 108. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).  
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reached a different conclusion when he 
disposed of the continuous surface connection. Instead, he determined that 
wetlands need to have a “significant nexus” to a body of water that 
“significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
covered waters . . . [which are already determined to be] ‘navigable.’”
110
 
However, Justice Kennedy also provided an out: if the “wetlands’ effects on 
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone 
fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’”
111
  
 The discrepancy between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia’s opinions 
adds even more confusion to a complicated subject,
112
 but the discussion of 
plurality versus plurality is beyond the scope of this Comment. Although 
these cases are nearly twenty years old, they are still critical in determining 
agency action over WOTUS. President Obama’s administration employed 
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, while President Trump directed 
his agencies to follow Justice Scalia’s opinion.
113
 The “significant nexus” 
test is clearly more encompassing of waters that fall under federal 
jurisdiction, while the “continuous surface connection” test requires more 
proof to reach that threshold.
114
  
D. County of Maui v. Hawaii Defenders of Wildlife 
The Court developed an entirely new test while wrestling with the 
question of whether a CWA permit is required when a pollutant that 
originates from a point source
115
 reaches a navigable water through a non-
                                                                                                                 
 109. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion). 
 110. Id. at 767, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 780. 
 112. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that when there 
is a plurality opinion with no controlling rationale, “the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). But see Nichols v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (“We think it not useful to pursue the Marks 
inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the 
lower courts that have considered it.”). 
 113. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
 114. Cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion) (explaining that Justice Kennedy’s 
test “would [at least] disallow some of the Corps’ excesses”). 
 115. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2018) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined, 
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”). 
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point source, such as groundwater.
116
 In this case, the County of Maui had a 
wastewater reclamation plant that pumped treated water from the plant 
hundreds of feet underground.
117
 Environmental groups then brought suit 
against the County of Maui for discharging a pollutant into a “navigable 
water” without the necessary CWA permit.
118
 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the environmental groups because “the 
pollutants discharged [without a permit] by the County at the [Lahaina 
Wastewater Reclamation Facility] injection wells migrate to the ocean . . . 
[and thus] the County is violating the Clean Water Act.”
119
 The district 
court noted that the wells’ discharge into the groundwater was “functionally 
one into navigable water[s].”
120
 
While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, it also 
narrowed the permitting standard. The old standard required that pollutants 
be “functionally [discharged] into navigable water,”
121
 but the new test 
required only that pollutants be “fairly traceable from the point source to a 
navigable water such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a 
discharge into the navigable water.”
122
 Because of the differences in 
applicable standards for determining when a pollutant is discharged into a 
navigable water—e.g., “fairly traceable,”
123
 having a “direct hydrological 
connection,”
124
 and even excluding discharges through ground water from 
the CWA permitting requirements
125
—the Court granted Maui’s petition for 
certiorari.  
                                                                                                                 
 116. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).  
 117. Id. at 1469.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 1000 (D. Haw. 2014). 
 120. Id. at 998.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (“[W]e hold that a plaintiff must allege a direct hydrological connection between 
ground water and navigable waters in order to state a claim under the CWA for a discharge 
of a pollutant that passes through ground water.”), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2736 
(2020) (mem.); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation 
and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2964 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 122, 412).  
 125. Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 932–33 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that “the CWA does not extend its reach to this form of pollution,” and thus 
disagreeing with the circuit court rulings in Upstate Forever and Haw. Wildlife Fund). 
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The County of Maui advocated for a bright line test: “[A] point source 
permit is necessary only where pollutants are being delivered to navigable 
waters by a point source or series of point sources.”
126
 Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund’s arguments aligned with the decision of the Ninth Circuit, requesting 
that “if pollutants are fairly traceable to the point source,” a CWA permit is 
necessary.
127
 The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, followed a recent 
EPA Interpretative Statement
128
 and asked the Court to confirm that the 
CWA reflects “Congress’s intent to leave regulation of releases of 
pollutants to groundwater with the states.”
129
 
The Court ultimately rejected all three arguments in favor of its own 
interpretation. First, the Court determined that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the phrase “from any point source” was too broad.
130
 Next, 
because of a “large and obvious loophole,”
131
 the Court rejected the County 
of Maui and the Solicitor General’s argument that if the pollutant traveled 
through any groundwater, the permitting requirement is not necessary.
132
 
Finally, as neither party nor the Solicitor General asked for Chevron 
deference
133
 on the EPA’s Interpretive Statement, the Court examined the 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 
(2020) (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 2068597, at *27.  
 127. Brief for Respondents at 13, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 
(2020) (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 3230945, at *13.  
 128. Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to 
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810, 16,814 (proposed Apr. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 122) [hereinafter Interpretive Statement] (“The interposition of groundwater 
between a point source and the navigable water thus may be said to break the causal chain 
between the two, or alternatively may be described as an intervening cause.”). 
 129. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Cty. of 
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 2153160, at *19 
(citing Interpretive Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,814).  
 130. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020). 
 131. Id. at 1474 (“If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, then why could not the 
pipe’s owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps 
only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before 
reaching the sea?” (citing Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 9 n.4, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-
260), 2019 WL 3336988, at *9 n.4.)). 
 132. Id.  
 133. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
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interpretation in light of agency expertise and practical experience.
134
 
During this examination, the Court concluded that the interpretation argued 




The Court held that “the statute requires a permit when there is a direct 
discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the 
functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”
136
 To determine whether there 
is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge, the Court gave a 
“nonexhaustive”
137
 list of seven factors:  
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the 
material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to 
which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, 
(5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative 
to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the 
manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable 
waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has 
maintained its specific identity.
138
 
Of these seven factors, the majority noted that “[t]ime and distance will be 
the most important factors in most cases,”
139
 but there are several other 
useful methods for courts to apply these factors. The Court acknowledged 
that these factors may be difficult to apply in practice, but the arguments 
proposed by both parties and the Solicitor General are inconsistent with 
congressional intent and the Court’s interpretation of the CWA.
140
 Because 
of the new functional equivalent test, this decision paves the way for further 
litigation over the new definitions of waters of the United States as defined 
by the Navigable Waters Protection Rule.  
  
                                                                                                                 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).  
 134. Cty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1475. 
 135. Id. at 1474.  
 136. Id. at 1476.  
 137. Id. at 1481 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 138. Id. at 1476–77 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. at 1477.  
 140. Id. 
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V. Navigable Waters Protection Rule 
On January 23, 2020, the EPA announced its newest definition of 
“waters of the United States” in the form of the Navigable Waters 
Protection Rule (NPWR), codified on April 21.
141
 This rule provides that 
there are now four clearly defined categories for waters of the United 
States: “(1) [t]he territorial seas and traditional navigable waters; (2) 
perennial and intermittent tributaries that contribute surface water flow to 
such waters; (3) certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters; and (4) wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.”
142
 This is a 
change from the previous 2015 Rule and President Trump’s Step 1 
recodification of pre-2015 CWA rules, some of which provided federal 





to a water that was already jurisdictional under the CWA. The goal of the 
NWPR is to set the “boundary between regulated ‘waters of the United 
States,’ and the waters subject solely to state and tribal authority.”
145
 The 
following subsections will dissect the new categories of waters of the 
United States and those types of waters explicitly excluded. 
A. Traditional Navigable Waters (TNWs) 
The first category of WOTUS on the NWPR list includes territorial seas 
and traditional navigable waters. Section (a)(1) of the NWPR defines this 
category to mean: “[t]he territorial seas, and waters which are currently 
used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or 
foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and flow 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17; see also EPA Press Office, EPA 
and Army Deliver on President Trump’s Promise to Issue the Navigable Waters Protection 
Rule – A New Definition of WOTUS, EPA (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/ 
newsreleases/epa-and-army-deliver-president-trumps-promise-issue-navigable-waters-
protection-rule-0. 
 142. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251. 
 143. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058 (defining adjacent waters as “bordering, 
contiguous, or neighboring” to “waters of the United States”). 
 144. Id. (defining “neighboring” further to include “(1) Waters located in whole or in part 
within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark” of a jurisdictional water; “(2) Waters 
located in whole or in part in the 100-year floodplain and that are within 1,500 feet of the 
ordinary high water mark” of a jurisdictional water; and “(3) Waters located in whole or in 
part within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a traditional navigable water or the territorial 
seas and waters located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great 
Lakes”). 
 145. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,269.  
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 This new definition does not provide any substantive 
changes to the text of previous rules regarding traditional navigable waters 
(TNWs); rather, the prior rules are now combined into one paragraph.
147
 
The rationale for combining these definitions into a single paragraph 
follows the mindset of commenters, stating that this single paragraph was to 
“help[] streamline the regulatory text” as this particular definition of TNWs 
is “well understood” by interpreters.
148
 The Agencies note that there has 




Included within this first category of jurisdictional waters alongside 
TNWs are territorial seas. “Territorial seas” are defined in the CWA as “the 
belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that 
portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line 
marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a 
distance of three miles.”
150
 The text of the NWPR notes that the 
streamlining of territorial seas and other waters that “are currently used, or 
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce”
151
 was added in order to prevent exclusion of waters that fit the 
definition of territorial seas under the CWA. 
The tradition of navigable waters has long been cemented in caselaw. In 
1870, the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball stated that waters are 
considered “navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of 
being used in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.”
152
 Over 
a century later, the Court further noted that federal jurisdiction of these 
navigable waters extends further than The Daniel Ball suggests, indicating 
that waters fall under CWA permitting authority when they are “relatively 
permanent bodies of water.”
153
 These navigable-in-fact waters fit the exact 
definition of a TNW.  
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 22,338. 
 147. Id. at 22,280. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 22,281. 
 150. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2018). 
 151. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,281. 
 152. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).  
 153. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 734 (2006) (“In addition, the Act’s use of 
the traditional phrase ‘navigable waters’ (the defined term) further confirms that it confers 
jurisdiction only over relatively permanent bodies of water.”). For a further discussion, see 
supra Section IV.C.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/5
2021] COMMENTS 357 
 
 
Some commenters expressed concern over whether these waters that are 
“susceptible of being used . . . for commerce,” as stated in The Daniel Ball, 
could be interpreted liberally to mean any water that has the possibility of 
floating a boat.
154
 However, this idea is quickly dispelled, as it takes “more 
than simply being able to float a boat to establish jurisdiction over 
navigable-in-fact waters under paragraph (a)(1); it requires evidence of 
physical capacity for commercial navigation and that it was, is, or actually 
could be used for that purpose.”
155
 
As there is not much change between previous definitions of territorial 
seas and this new proposed definition, there is little room for dissenters to 
complain. In fact, it appears that consolidating these definitions in a single 
paragraph creates a simplified and clearer explanation for traditional 
navigable waters.  
B. Tributaries 
The second category of WOTUS on the NWPR list is tributaries. Section 
(a)(2) notes that “tributaries” are jurisdictional waters under the CWA.
156
 A 
tributary is defined as a “river, stream, or similar naturally occurring 
surface water channel that contributes surface water flow” to a subsection 
(a)(1) water (TNWs) “in a typical year either directly or through one or 
more waters identified in paragraph (a)(2), (3), or (4).”
157
 The Agencies 
chose this definition to “establish a clear and easily implementable 
definition” that is “consistent with the role of the Federal government under 
the Constitution and the CWA.”
158
 This idea is driven by a precedent 




The definition of tributaries includes many changes from previous rules. 
Notably, a water must contribute a flow of surface water during a “typical 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,281–82. 
 155. Id. at 22,282 (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS JURISDICTION DETERMINATION FORM INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK app. D (2007), 
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll11/id/2316).  
 156. Id. at 22,338. 
 157. Id. at 22,339. 
 158. Id. at 22,287.  
 159. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (holding that CWA jurisdiction using the “‘Migratory Bird Rule’ 
would . . . result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power 
over land and water use”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) 
(“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”).  
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 The term “typical year” is defined to mean a year “when 
precipitation and other climatic variables are within the normal periodic 
range (e.g., seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of the applicable 
aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.”
161
 More importantly, 
the Agencies also clarify that tributaries are only jurisdictional if they have 
a “relatively permanent” surface water contribution.
162
  
Some commenters have expressed concerns that this definition of 
“tributary” is unfounded and inconsistent with science, the CWA, and 
existing caselaw.
163
 The EPA’s Science Advisory Board proposed a 
Connectivity Report, which stated that “ephemeral, intermittent, and 
perennial streams exert a strong influence on the character and function of 
downstream waters and that tributary streams are connected to downstream 
waters.”
164
 While the EPA notes that this Connectivity Report was 
influential in creating the definition of tributaries, it is not the sole factor 
used to create policy.
165
 This definition—which excludes ephemeral 






Following the same line of thinking, when there is a “break” that 
prevents the flow of water from a tributary to a TNW, the upstream 
tributary is not considered a WOTUS under the NWPR.
168
 These instances 
of an artificial or natural “break” split waters of jurisdiction. These breaks 
prevent jurisdiction under the CWA, as this water would not contribute to 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,274. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 22,273–74. 
 163. Id. at 22,288. 
 164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Letter from David T. Allen, Chair, Sci. 
Advisory Bd., & Amanda D. Rodewald, Chair, SAB Panel for the Review of the EPA Water 
Body Connectivity Rep., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (Oct. 17, 2014) at 3). 
 165. Id. at 22,261 (“[S]cience cannot dictate where to draw the line between Federal and 
State waters, as this is a legal question that must be answered based on the overall 
framework and construct of the CWA.”).  
 166. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
168 n.3 (2001) (explaining that while the Conference Report discussing the term “navigable 
waters” noted the term should “be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation,” 
nothing in the report indicated that “Congress intended to exert anything more than its 
commerce power over navigation”).  
 167. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 733 (2006) (stating that waters of the 
United States should “include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of 
water”). 
 168. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,276–77.  
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the surface water flow necessary to establish flow on a perennial or 
intermittent basis.
169
 This new rule has caused apprehension as some public 
comments demonstrate a fear that excluding waters upstream from breaks 
would prevent jurisdiction for waters that would typically be considered 
TNWs, but are now excluded due to the break.
170
 However, the Agencies 
provide that “channelized non-jurisdictional surface water features do not 
sever jurisdiction of upstream perennial or intermittent waters so long as 
they convey surface water from such upstream waters to downstream 
jurisdictional waters in a typical year.”
171
 “Channelized” is further defined 
to mean water flows with a “defined path or course” and that these flows 
are restricted to their defined path or course.
172
 
Finally, in cases where there are features that disturb the surface water 
flow (such as dams, boulder fields, or gravel pits) but do not sever the 
surface flow, the Agencies have determined that these waters are still 
considered jurisdictional if they meet the other requirements of the CWA.
173
 
However, if these features themselves do not meet the definition of a 
tributary from (a)(2) of the NWPR, they are not jurisdictional, regardless of 
whether these features convey a surface water flow.
174
 
Some of the biggest shifts in defining WOTUS fall under the tributary 
section of the NWPR. Further analysis of ditches and how they fit into this 
equation are discussed below.
175
 While the overall theme of the NWPR is to 
offer greater clarity when it comes to defining WOTUS, there are still 
instances when a case-by-case analysis of individual waters would be the 
best test to determine federal jurisdiction.  
C. Lakes and Ponds, and Impoundments of Jurisdictional Waters 
The third category of WOTUS on the NWPR list includes lakes and 
ponds and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. Section (a)(3) defines 
lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters to be “waters of 
the United States.”
176
 Specifically, a lake, pond, or impoundment is a 
jurisdictional water under three rules: (1) it is considered a territorial sea or 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 22,289. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See infra Section VI.A. 
 176. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,300. 
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TNW as defined under section (a)(1); (2) it “contributes surface water flow 
to the territorial seas or a traditional navigable water in a typical year either 
directly or through one or more jurisdictional waters;” or (3) it “is 
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical 
year.”
177
 Further, if a lake, pond, or impoundment is considered a 
jurisdictional water, it does not lose this status if the surface water flow 
reaches an already-regulated water in a typical year “through a channelized 
non-jurisdictional surface water feature.”
178
 Examples of these channelized, 
non-jurisdictional surface water features include both artificial features, 




Separating lakes, ponds, and impoundments from adjacent waters is a 
departure from the 2015 Rule. The 2015 Rule included all lakes and ponds 
within 1,500 feet of a tributary, and other, qualified, lakes and ponds that 
could be up to 4,000 feet from a jurisdictional water.
180
 The key distinction 
between the two rules is highlighted by the NWPR’s regulation of waters 
that drain downstream into an already jurisdictional water, regardless of the 
distance between the two bodies of water. However, a lake, pond, or 
impoundment is considered a WOTUS only if the water flows from a 
jurisdictional water to the pond, lake, or impoundment.
181
 
Overall, while there is some change in how the NWPR affects lakes, 
ponds, and impoundments, these changes are familiar as they follow both 
legal and administrative precedents,
182
 albeit in a slightly narrower view. 
Now these types of water are combined into a single definition, with lakes, 
ponds, and impoundments qualifying as jurisdictional if, in a typical year, 




                                                                                                                 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058–059. 
 181. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251. This flow of water 
from the jurisdictional water to the lake, pond, or impoundment makes that feature a part of 
the jurisdictional water, thereby making it jurisdictional as well. Id. 
 182. Id. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos stated that the term “the waters” is 
most commonly understood to refer to “‘streams and bodies forming geographical features 
such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or ‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, 
making up such streams or bodies.’” 547 U.S. at 732 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). 
 183. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251. 
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D. Adjacent Wetlands 
The fourth category of WOTUS on the NWPR list is adjacent wetlands. 
Section (a)(4) defines the last section of waters to be considered WOTUS 
under the NWPR: adjacent wetlands.
184
 In a pattern beginning to feel 
familiar to readers, there are several specific factors that an adjacent 
wetland must meet in order to be a jurisdictional water. To be jurisdictional, 
the adjacent wetland must meet one or more of the following: (1) abut a 
territorial sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or 
impoundment; (2) in a typical year, be flooded by a territorial sea, TNW, 
tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment; (3) be physically 
separated from a territorial sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, 
or impoundment by a natural feature; or (4) be separated from a territorial 
sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment by an 
artificial feature, but only if the feature allows for a “direct hydrologic 
surface connection” between this adjacent wetland and the territorial sea, 
TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment in a typical 
year.
185
 For example, a wetland will be considered a jurisdictional water if it 
is divided by a “berm, bank, dune, or other similar feature” or an artificial 
feature, such as a road or a culvert, as long as there is a “direct hydrological 
connection through or over that structure in a typical year.”
186
  
Just as with the lakes, ponds, and impoundments, the departure from the 
previous rule involves changing from a specific distance to a jurisdictional 
water requirement.
187
 As a result, regulated wetlands are: directly abutted or 
flooded by a jurisdictional water; separated from jurisdictional waters by 
natural features; or separated from jurisdictional waters by artificial features 
that allow water to pass through.
188
 Another textual change is that the 
NWPR eliminates the “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” language 
from the 2015 Rule,
189
 while using the familiar “adjacent” term, in an effort 
to “reduce the potential confusion associated with using [these] three 




                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 22,338. 
 185. Id. at 22,251. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,059.  
 188. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,312–13. 
 189. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 30,755.  
 190. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,307. 
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E. Non-WOTUS Waters 
Section (b) of the rule sets forth twelve exclusions from WOTUS under 
the CWA.
191
 Many of the waters explicitly excluded are consistent with 
previous interpretations.
192
 Foremost, any body of water that does not 
explicitly fit the definitions from paragraphs (a)(1)–(4) is not regulated by 
the CWA.
193 
Some of these excluded waters include groundwater, 
“irrigation ditches” and “irrigation canals” which have “irrigation returns 




 is further defined to mean 
“any land area that under normal circumstances does not satisfy all three 
wetland factors (i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils) 
identified in paragraph (c)(16) of this section, and does not lie below the 
ordinary high water mark or the high tide line of a jurisdictional water.”
196
 
The goal of the excluded waters in section (b) of the NWPR is to follow 
long-standing practice while eliminating confusion over which waters are 
regulated by the CWA and which waters are not.
197
 
VI. Impact of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule on Agriculture 
Agriculture industry leaders
198
 praised the adoption of the NWPR as it 
provides greater clarity in determining which waters fall under federal 
jurisdiction and which waters are regulated on the local level.
199
 Prior to the 
introduction of the NWPR, many notable complaints from agriculturists 
were that the federal government was overreaching its bounds to regulate 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Id. at 22,278. 
 192. See id. at 22,317 (“Two of the exclusions (waste treatment systems and prior 
converted cropland) have been expressly included in the regulatory text for decades.”). 
 193. Id. at 22,338 (emphasis added).  
 194. Id. at 22,261. 
 195. See infra Section VI.B (further discussing the term “upland”). 
 196. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,339. 
 197. Id. at 22,317–18.  
 198. Agricultural industry leaders who praised the NWPR include Zippy Duval, 
President of the American Farm Bureau Federation; Roger Johnson, President of the 
National Farmers Union; Ben Scholz, President of the National Association of Wheat 
Growers; Bill Gordon, President of the American Soybean Association; Jennifer Houston, 
President of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; David Herring, President of the 
National Pork Producers Council; and Barbara Glenn, CEO of the National Association of 
State Departments of Agriculture.  
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waters where it has no authority to regulate.
200
 Even the Supreme Court 




As the NWPR relates to agriculture, the major changes from the previous 
rules to this current rule focus on categories (a)(2) (tributaries) and (a)(4) 
(adjacent wetlands). Both areas are essential to agriculture as they are 
commonly found on an individual landowner’s property. As Justice Scalia 
noted, “[C]lean water is not the only purpose of the [Clean Water Act]. So 
is the preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary land-use 
decisions.”
202
 The Agencies wanted to ensure that “States and Tribes retain 




Tributaries are only jurisdictional waters if their surface contribution 
flows at a perennial or intermittent rate, and this flow contribution arrives at 
a TNW in a typical year.
204
 This distinction is key because it changes the 
regulation of waters that have an ephemeral flow. Ephemeral flows occur 







 water flows require continuous flow, ephemeral waters fail to 
meet this standard.  
This definition of tributary replaces Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” test, which analyzed waters on a case-by-case basis.
208
 The 
Agencies think this new definition will provide greater clarity across the 
board.
209
 Implementation of the new definition for tributaries will require 
the identification of distinct features to determine whether a tributary 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Id. 
 201. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).  
 202. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 755–56 (2006) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(b)). 
 203. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,269. 
 204. Id. at 22,287. 
 205. Id. at 22,338. 
 206. Id. at 22,338 (“The term intermittent means surface water flowing continuously 
during certain times of the year and more than in direct response to precipitation . . . .”).  
 207. Id. at 22,339 (“The term perennial means surface water flowing continuously year-
round.”). 
 208. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the 
wetland in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.”).  
 209. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,270–71. 
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 However, identification will be an easier process than “multi-
factored case-specific significant nexus analysis.”
211
 
Ditches, while not on the list of WOTUS—and thereby exempted unless 
they have other qualifications—are nearly exclusively exempt from federal 
jurisdiction under the CWA.
212
 The Agencies, noting that determining 
whether ditches are federally jurisdictional has been a great source of 
confusion for agriculturalists,
213
 proposed three categories of ditches which 
are jurisdictional waters, and the rest were exempt:  
(1) [d]itches that are traditional navigable waters or that are 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide (e.g., paragraph (a)(1) 
waters); (2) ditches that are constructed in tributaries or that 
relocate or alter tributaries as long as the ditch satisfies the flow 
conditions of the tributary definition; and (3) ditches constructed 
in adjacent wetlands as long as the ditch likewise satisfies the 
conditions of the tributary definition.
214
 
The NWPR, however, decided against creating a free-standing category 
for ditches and blended the Agencies’ proposal into the “tributary” 
category.
215
 The goal of this new rule is to alleviate the confusion and 
provide greater clarity, as the regulation of all other types of ditches is best 
left to the states and tribes.
216
  
Specific to agriculture and irrigation ditches, Congress has already 
granted an exemption to the construction or maintenance of these ditches if 
they are associated with normal farming activities.
217
 There is little 
legislative history that precisely identifies Congress’s exact reasoning for 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 22,270 (“[T]he agencies acknowledge that field work may frequently be 
necessary to verify whether a feature is a water of the United States.”). 
 211. Id. at 22,270–71 (“The application of a clear test for categorically covered and 
excluded waters, as presented in this final rule, is inherently less complicated than a complex 
multi-factored significant nexus test that must be applied on a case-by-case basis to 
countless waters and wetlands across the nation.”). 
 212. Id. at 22,251–52. 
 213. See id. at 22,295. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. at 22,295–96 (noting that States and Tribes retain regulatory power over “all 
other ditches . . . as part of their primary authority over land and water resources within their 
borders” (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1370)). 
 217. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A), (C) (2018) (exempting activities of normal farming and 
ranching, the construction of farm or stock ponds, and the construction and maintenance of 
drainage ditches from sections 301, 402, and 404 of the CWA). 
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 Nevertheless, ditches could still be subject to 
regulation even if they do not meet the definition of a tributary. If a ditch is 
classified as a point source,
219
 it could still be subject to CWA permitting 
under the NWPR rule.
220
 The bottom line regarding ditches is that they are 
excluded unless they are already considered a jurisdictional water or meet 
the definition of a point source. However, the burden of proof for 
determining whether a ditch is a jurisdictional water under the definition of 
a tributary falls to the Agencies.
221
 
B. Adjacent Wetlands 
As discussed above, there are four specific ways for a wetland to be 
considered a jurisdictional water.
222
 However, land that does meet all three 
of the wetland factors from the Army Corps of Engineer’s Wetlands 
Delineation Manual
223
 or as defined by the Agencies
224
 is to be considered 
“upland” and not a jurisdictional water. Uplands could be previous 
wetlands that have been converted by natural transformation or lawful 
conversion.
225
 Adjacent wetlands, under the NWPR, are narrowed to 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,296 (“One possible 
interpretation of these exemptions is that they function as an implicit acknowledgement that 
there may be some irrigation or drainage ditches that are waters of the United States, thus the 
need to exempt common agricultural and related practices in those waters from CWA 
section 404 permitting.”).  
 219. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”). 
 220. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,297 (“Either it is a water 
of the United States that subjects a discharger to sections 402 and 404 permitting 
requirements for direct discharges into the ditch, or, if it is non-jurisdictional but conveys 
pollutants to downstream jurisdictional waters, it may be a point source that subjects a 
discharger into a ditch to section 402 permitting requirements.”). 
 221. DEP’T OF THE ARMY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION 
RULE: RURAL AMERICA AND THE NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION RULE 2 (2020) 
[hereinafter RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR] (fact sheet) (“Absent such evidence, the 
agencies will determine the ditch is non-jurisdictional.”).  
 222. See supra Part V. 
 223. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLANDS DELINEATION 
MANUAL 9–10 (Jan. 1987) (“Wetlands have the following general diagnostic environmental 
characteristics: (1) Vegetation . . . (2) Soil . . . [and] (3) Hydrology.”).  
 224. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,308 (including factors for 
defining a wetland, “i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and hydric soils”). 
 225. Id. 
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wetlands, rather than “all waters” adjacent to CWA-jurisdictional waters as 
prescribed under the 2015 Rule.
226
 
C. Non-Jurisdictional Waters  
Further excluded waters are all groundwaters, ephemeral features, and 
prior converted cropland. The NWPR offers clarification for each of these 
categories. Groundwaters exempted include all “groundwater drained 
through subsurface drainage systems.”
227
 This groundwater exemption is 
crucial to agriculture because it excludes drainage systems, such as tile 
drains, from agricultural land.
228
 Ephemeral features are discussed above,
229
 
but include almost any type of waterbody created by precipitation.
230
 These 
are particularly vital for agriculture as these features are common among 
landowners. Prior converted cropland includes any land, before December 




Prior converted cropland can only be considered a jurisdictional water 
under the CWA if the “area is abandoned and has reverted to [a 
jurisdictional] wetland[].”
232
 Abandonment occurs when the “prior 
converted cropland is not used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes at 
least once in the immediately preceding five years.”
233
 A crucial distinction 
is that cropland that is undisturbed for any conservation or agricultural 
purpose is still considered an agricultural use, and the exemption will still 
apply to these lands.
234
  
Finally, any artificial lake or pond that is constructed in upland or non-
jurisdictional waters is not considered a WOTUS under the CWA.
235
 Even 
if these waters have a surface water connection to a downstream 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 30,758–59. 
 227. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251.  
 228. RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR, supra note 221, at 3.  
 229. See supra Section VI.A. 
 230. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,317 (excluding “ephemeral 
features, including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and pools”). 
 231. Id. at 22,339. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR, supra note 221, at 2–3.  
 235. Id. at 3. 
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jurisdictional water, these upland waters are excluded.
236
 Uses of this water 
can be for irrigation or creating stock or farm ponds.
237
  
These new changes created by the NWPR will have a positive impact on 
agriculturalists. The new categories under the NWPR establish an 
application process that is streamlined based on existing definitions from 
previous precedent and tailored to the powers delineated to the Agencies by 
Congress. Because the NWPR proposes easy-to-apply rules to determine 
the jurisdictional status of a water, landowners are spared excess costs and 
time that was previously lost in the confusing and complex permitting 
process from earlier regulation. The NWPR should stop the shifting 
definition of waters of United States, at least for now.  
VII. Litigation over the Navigable Waters Protection Rule 
In the Supreme Court’s most recent WOTUS decision—County of 
Maui
238
—none of the opinions addressed the Navigable Waters Protection 
Rule (NWPR) in detail. The facts in County of Maui did not support any 
argument that the Pacific Ocean was not clearly a navigable water subject 
to CWA requirements.
239
 However, if future NWPR litigation calls into 
question whether a water is considered a WOTUS under the NWPR, 
County of Maui will be heavily involved in both arguments and determining 
the outcome. Many different groups, from states to industry groups, are 
attacking the NWPR. Some claim that the NWPR is a vast overreach by the 
federal government,
240
 while others say it is woefully inadequate in 
protecting our nation’s waters.
241
 Both of these arguments are analyzed 
below. 
A. NWPR Is Overreach by Federal Government 
Several ranchers in western states claim this new WOTUS rule is a 
violation of the Constitution, the Clean Water Act, and Supreme Court 
precedent.
242
 Further, New Mexico Cattle Grower’s Association argues that 
the NWPR is an “illegal interpretation” by the Army Corps of Engineers 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
 239. See id. at 1469 (describing the Pacific Ocean as a navigable water). 
 240. See infra Section VII.A. 
 241. See infra Section VII.B. 
 242. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19–20, Or. Cattlemen’s Ass’n v. 
Wheeler, No. 3:19-cv-00564-AC (D. Or. filed Apr. 16, 2019). 
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and the EPA because these interpretations are arbitrary and capricious, ultra 
vires, and violate the Administrative Procedure Act.
243
 These groups attack 
several of the specific definitions of TNWs because of lack of conformity 
with Supreme Court precedent and previous interpretation by the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the EPA.
244
 For example, intermittent tributaries 
could now be considered navigable waters because there is no minimum 




These farmers and ranchers argue that the NWPR places an undue 
burden on them to operate their land by requiring costly permit approval 
under the CWA.
246
 These costs can be amplified because the CWA is 
unique in that “most laws do not require the hiring of expert consultants to 
determine if [the law] appl[ies] to you or your property.”
247
 Both the New 
Mexico Cattle Grower’s and Oregon Cattlemen’s Association’s lawsuits 
request declaratory and injunctive relief that invalidates the NWPR.
248
 
B. NWPR Ignores Science and Precedent 
Several state attorneys general and environmental groups have also filed 
lawsuits against the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, but they are 
arguing the other side of the spectrum from what the landowners and 
ranchers argued in their lawsuit: that the NWPR does not do enough to 
protect waters of the United States.
249
 These groups have argued that the 
NWPR “expressly” ignores the purpose of the CWA and “hampers the 
objective to restore and maintain our Nation’s waters.”
250
 Despite the 
                                                                                                                 
 243. First Supplemental Complaint at 14, 18, N.M. Cattle Grower’s Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, No. 1:19-cv-00988-JHR-SCY (D.N.M. filed Apr. 27, 2020). 
 244. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 18, 25.  
 245. First Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 30. 
 246. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 18; First 
Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 15. 
 247. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 944, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(Kelly, J., concurring), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). 
 248. First Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 44–47; Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 26–27.  
 249. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 24, 
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 1:20-cv-01064-GLR (D. Md. filed Apr. 
27, 2020).  
 250. Id. 
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different arguments being made, the request for relief is the same: vacate 




Overall, the area of permitting will continue to provide litigation and 
administrative dispute for some time, especially as the Navigable Waters 
Protection Rule is published in the Federal Register. While the intent to 
create new, easier-to-understand, and less powerful regulations for the 
federal control of waters is an admirable one, environmental rights groups 
and others will argue that this deregulation will have adverse effects on 
water quality.
252
 The merits of their arguments are (again) beyond the scope 
of this Comment, but they raise what I believe to be a moot point: the 
deregulation is a bit of a misnomer. The deregulation does not completely 
gut any provision to protect the “waters of the United States.” If the federal 
government is unable to regulate these waters, there are still state 
regulations which protect the environment.
253
 However, the protection of 
our waters is still an important endeavor and one that will continue to grow 
in importance. Indeed, “among these treasures of our land is water fast 




Hammons P. Hepner 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Id. at 37; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, State et al. 
v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-03005 (N.D. Cal. filed May 5, 2020).  
 252. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 251, at 16.  
 253. See, e.g., 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2011) (noting that public water is “for the benefit 
and welfare of the people of the state” and is subject to state appropriation and pollution 
laws). 
 254. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at the Dedication of McNary Dam, Walla 
Walla, Washington (Sept. 23, 1954), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232715. 
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